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Abstract Today, the frequency and the rate of success
resulting from advances in medicine have made organ
transplantations an everyday occurrence. Still, organ
transplantations and donations modify the subjective
experience of human beings as regards the image they have
of themselves, of body, of life and of death. If the concern
of the quality of life and the survival of the patients is a
completely human phenomenon, the fact remains that the
possibility of organ transplantation and its justification
depend a great deal on the culture in which we live. The
exploration of the philosophical tradition allows for a
reconsideration of organ transplantation. If we listen to
people who have experienced the decline of one of their
organs and their own rebirth through the organ of someone
else, we arrive at the conclusion that they went through an
extreme experience in which nothing appeared as before.
All those experiences intensify philosophical questionings
on the meaning of life with respect to self fulfilment. The
concept of nature as the experience of others can be an
authentic source from which to nourish our thoughts about
organ transplantation. However, and this is our hypothesis,
we need something more if we are to decide something
about our own life. We need a hermeneutical stance in
relation to ourselves and to our world. Philosophical
counselling, as a long established tradition originating with
Pythagoras and later reframed by the German philosopher
Achenbach could be useful in inspiring a reflection on the
good life, chiefly as it takes the form of a Socratic dialogue.
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Introduction
The middle of the last century saw the first successful
attempts at kidney transplantations. Other successful
transplantation experiments soon followed: liver, heart,
lungs and pancreas. Today, the frequency and the rate of
success resulting from advances in medicine have made
organ transplantations an everyday occurrence (Linden
2009). Still, organ transplantations and donations modify
the subjective experience of human beings as regards the
image they have of themselves, of body, of life and of
death. The blending of bodies also challenges formerly
indisputable natural limits. Furthermore, transplantation
eventually leads to a questioning of the very purpose of
medicine: does it exist to care, to cure and to relieve suf-
fering or does it exist to improve the human race?
Organ transplantation thus poses a certain number of
inescapable ethical problems. Those who become involved
in the sphere of organ transplantation raise the question of
consent, the definition of death, the notion of mutilation of
the body, the rules of distribution of organs, or the trans-
formation of the body into a business affair. Hence, ethi-
cists are generally asked to remedy these problematical
situations by bringing forth normative or prescriptive rules
as though ethics could be reduced to resolving problems by
eschewing the question of the meaning of life, i.e. the
question of fulfilment of the self. The risk here consists in
managing such a situation by brushing aside philosophical
questions, such as those regarding the meaning of life and
death, which are appropriate questions on human existence
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and what constitutes the good life. This reflection on the
good life may become a part of a greater quest for wisdom
that is often grounded in the knowledge of reality, i.e. what
must be is prescribed by nature. In this sense, wisdom has
long been associated with harmony as established by nat-
ure, except that this wisdom appears differently to the
ancient Greeks, to the Moderns and to contemporaries.
They each have their own way of deliberating on the good
life.
If the concern of the quality of life and the survival of
the patients is a completely human phenomenon, the fact
remains that the possibility of organ transplantation and its
justification depend a great deal on the culture in which we
live. The exploration of the philosophic tradition allows
reconsidering otherwise the organ transplantation as a
simple replacement of exchangeable body parts. Thus, the
concept of nature, as elaborated by Aristotle and Descartes
and its representation within naturalism may be used to
show how organ transplantation is or is not justified. Then,
an examination of a phenomenological and hermeneutical
perspective will allow us to sidestep the stumbling block of
essentialism. If we listen to people who have experienced
the decline of one of their organs and their own rebirth
through the organ of someone else, we arrive at the con-
clusion that they went through an extreme experience in
which nothing appeared as before: that of being one person
and multiple people at the same time, of having within
them a living dead person, of having their own life through
the death of another, of being a survivor. All those expe-
riences intensify the philosophical questionings on identity,
on the relationship between soul and body, on the onto-
logical status of the body, and principally on the meaning
of life.
The concept of nature as the experience of others all can
be an authentic source to nourish our thought about organ
transplantation. But, and this is our hypotheses, we need
something more if we want to decide something about our
life. We need a hermeneutical stance about oneself and our
world. Philosophical counselling, as a long tradition from
Pythagoras and so on, reframed by the German philosopher
Gerd Achenbach in the 1980 could be helpful to reflect on
the good life, mainly if it takes the form of a Socratic
dialogue.
The division between facts and values
Since the time of Plato, one of the characteristics of phi-
losophy has been to provide justification. The question then
consists in knowing how to justify organ transplantation
within the meaning of human existence. This consideration
of the question of meaning widely exceeds modern sci-
ence’s empirical analysis of the causes. We are, therefore,
confronted with the split between the power of instru-
mental rationality and the wisdom derived from axiological
rationality, as well as with the confusion between the
legitimacy of scientific knowledge and the legitimacy of its
common practice (Wolff 2010, p. 19).
This division was first underlined by David Hume in his
Treatise of the Human Nature published in 1739. He
observed that our arguments often proceed from a
description of facts which ends in a normative claim. For
Hume, this kind of leap was unacceptable. G.E. Moore, in
his Pincipia Ethica published in 1903, took up this problem
by elaborating the concept of ‘‘naturalistic fallacy’’, albeit
by approaching it from the opposite direction.
For Moore, it was wrong to analyze an ethical propo-
sition by defining the good by way of natural properties.
For some, the world of facts described by science and the
world of values described by ethics must remain different.
With the advent of positivism, science even made it a point
of honour not consider values as possible objects of sci-
ence. However, the development of the cognitive sciences
(Gardner 1985; Dupuy 1994; Ganascia 1996) integrated
within the paradigm of naturalism, raises the taboo sur-
rounding the division between facts and values. Values
then appear as epiphenomena of nature.
The point of view of Aristotle
From a hypothetical perspective, even if the ancient Greeks
had acquired the necessary knowledge and technical means
to perform organ transplantation, it is highly unlikely that
they would have accepted the practice, as they had no
conceptual framework that would allow them to justify
such a procedure. What would such a conceptual frame-
work require? For practical reasons, let us limit ourselves
to that of Aristotle.
In his writings, Aristotle often refers to medicine. It
appears as a model by which to consider nature, ethics and
politics. This comes as no surprise when we consider that
his father was a doctor in the court of the king of Mace-
donia. It is quite probable that Aristotle was schooled
directly by his father in the rudiments of the biology and
medicine of the age. Although Aristotle showed an interest
in medicine, it was mainly biology and anatomy that held
his attention and inspired his quest to better understand
nature.
Aristotle’s major contribution to ancient medicine con-
sists in his doctrine of the four fundamental qualities, that
is to say, warmth, cold, wet and dry. It is these four fun-
damental qualities that make possible the notion of har-
mony and homeostasis in ancient medicine and contribute
to the health of the body. Therefore, Aristotle placed
knowledge of nature above medicine. Even today, medical
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students begin their studies by learning the fundamental
sciences before integrating the study of the various sys-
tems, such as the endocrine system, the nervous system, the
circulatory system. Only at the end of their medical train-
ing do they study the clinical aspect.
How exactly did Aristotle view nature? In Physics,
Aristotle indicated that ‘‘of things that exist, some exist by
nature, some from other causes’’ (1941, p. 236). Things
that exist according to nature find in themselves their own
cause. ‘‘Each of them has within itself a principle of motion
and of immobility’’ (1941, p. 236). This is how Aristotle
defined nature. It is the principle and the cause of move-
ment and of rest of things by design and not by accident
(1941, p. 251). In short, nature is an immanent principle of
spontaneity: nature acts as a man who cures himself (1941,
p. 251). This is why health is a reflection of the balance of
the elements of nature. This balance cannot be imposed
from without, by accident.
Nature is the shape that is outlined in the definition of
the thing (1941, p. 237), and this shape does not exist
separately from the thing, ‘‘except in statement’’ (1941,
p. 238). Aristotle, in his Parts of Animals, warns readers
that what is under discussion is not the material part, ‘‘but
the relation of such part to the total form’’ (1941, p. 657).
In this way, for human beings, the body represents the
material, and the soul, the form that give the body its
constitution and its principle of movement. Thus, ‘‘soul is
the actuality of a body’’ (1941, p. 555). However, if the
soul is common to all living things, these faculties are not
distributed in equal measure. Plants have only the nutri-
tional faculty, while animals possess, in addition, the sen-
sory and motor faculties, whereas human beings possess all
of these, as well as the intellectual faculty. The distribution
of the faculties of the soul infers a hierarchy between
beings without, however, establishing an ontological break.
There is continuity between beings.
For Aristotle, things possess a unique, necessary and
universal essence. This point to an essentialist epistemo-
logical universe in which things are constant. The invari-
ability of the essence of things implies that things, in their
essence, pre-existed before human beings, and are, and will
always be, what they are at the moment. Thus the essence
of a thing is conferred by its ‘‘shape’’ and its function. In
the teleological universe of Aristotle, there exists a narrow
relationship between the shape of organs and their func-
tions. The function determines the shape of the organ. As
Wolff stated, ‘‘Metaphysical essentialism is linked to bio-
logical fixism’’ (2010, p. 166).1
The good, for man as for things, consists in being in
compliance with one’s essence. Existing is to live
according to one’s type, according to that which defines
one. It appears that every thing has its natural place that is
also its shape and its purpose. For Aristotle, human beings
and living things encompass each other as one being that is
part of a whole or of nature, insofar as it designates the
totality of the being in movement. For example, in the case
of the heart and the body, the relationship is one of the
parts within the whole. It would be absurd to isolate the
heart from the body. Without the body, the heart is no more
than a heap of cells, and without the heart, the body
becomes a corpse. Therefore, there are movements that
may be called violent because they run counter to nature,
insofar as these movements are influenced by an outside
force. A heart is not of itself transplanted into another
body. It requires outside forces.
And so, the art of curing derives its principles from the
knowledge of nature. In this way, Aristotle distinguishes
the art of curing understood as the efficient cause and
health understood as final cause, as what strives towards its
true shape or true nature (1941, p. 238). As for human
beings, their highest function consists in contemplating
nature. Human beings thus find in nature an immanent
limit. Therefore, for the Greeks, there exists an intelligence
specific to nature. It is in this sense that for Aristotle, the
good par excellence consists in performing its function
(1941, p. 942). Nature, as much for Aristotle as for the
ancient Greeks, appears as a cosmic order that preserves
itself and is renewed in eternal return (Gadamer 1995,
p. 56). In this frame of mind, medical intervention consists
in restoring a disrupted balance. It does nothing other than
state the conditions for restoring the balance. Knowledge is
limited to observing and discovering this natural intelli-
gence. Thus it was a matter of doctors intervening as little
as possible in order to respect the natural order. They were
required to intervene, but remain mindful to act only to
restore natural harmony. Transplantation is in no way
natural. It stems from an outside, accidental and violent
force.
Christianity brought the first upheaval of this idea of
nature as a self-referential entity. Nature became a creation
of God from which God excluded himself. This marked the
‘‘desubstantialization’’ of nature. The genius of Descartes,
if indeed genius there were, would consist in claiming that
we could explain nature without resorting to God, its
creator.
The point of view of Descartes
Descartes had an immense impact on the development of
medicine. Although he was not himself a doctor, he was
surrounded by many prominent physicians such as Vopis-
cus Plemp, Johan van Beverwijck, Cornelis van Hogen-
lande and Johan Elichman. In Discourse on the Method,1 My own translation.
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published in 1637, Descartes expressed his interest in
medicine. He wished ‘‘to acquire some knowledge of nat-
ure from which we may derive rules in medicine that are
more reliable than those we have had up till now’’ (1985,
p. 151). Medicine, based on the knowledge of nature,
would make human beings wiser. Descartes again revealed
his interest in medicine in a letter to Huygens in January
1638, ‘‘Je travaille maintenant a` composer un Abre´ge´ de
me´decine, que je tire en partie des livres et en partie de mes
raisonnements’’ .2 Also in a letter to Mersenne dated
February 20th, 1639, Descartes mentioned that he had been
practicing dissection on animals for several years. ‘‘I have
spent much time on dissection during the last 11 years, and
I doubt whether there is any doctor who has made such
detailed observations as I’’ (1991, p. 134). However, Des-
cartes’ research on physiology was limited to the heart.
Consequently, when he gave advice, in the absence of
discovering ‘‘a medicine which is founded on infallible
demonstrations’’ (1991, p. 17), he probably relied on
Hippocrates and Galen (Lindeboom 1978, p. 42). Similarly,
when he faced moral questions, Descartes relied on tradi-
tion. This could be termed clinical medicine by provision.
In order to succeed in basing medicine on indubitable
knowledge, Descartes developed a method that consisted in
separating mind from matter. This method may be defined
as methodological dualism that allowed for a conception of
the world according to two substances: res extensa that
corresponds to the world of external bodies determined by
extension and movement, and res cogitans that corresponds
to mental substances. Whereas these two spheres of reality
are separated on a methodological level, they are bound to
each other in the human experience. This subject will be
dealt with further, later on. Descartes believed that the
body was a substance which contained nothing of the mind.
Moreover, because animals do not possess thinking souls,
they were perceived by Descartes as pure automatons.3 In
fact, the body, such as presented in the sixth Meditation on
First Philosophy, was seen as a machine. Descartes com-
pared it more precisely to a clock or to a fountain. Thus, he
demonstrated that bodies were subject to the action of
natural and mechanical laws, and not to outside force, as
suggested by Aristotle, who proposed a principle of ani-
mation that he believed resided in the soul.
For Descartes, the universe, ‘‘the earth as the heavens’’,
is made of a single matter in such a way as to occupy ‘‘all
conceivable spaces’’ (1985, p. 232). In brief, ‘‘there is but a
single matter existing in the universe’’ (1985, p. 232). It
derives its own properties ‘‘from the movement of its
parts’’ (1985, p. 232), so that we might say that the body is
seen as a machine that generates its own movement much
as do ‘‘clocks, artificial fountains, mills, and other such
machines, that, although man-made, have the power to
move under their own power’’ (1985, p. 99). All body
movements arise in one way or another ‘‘without any
contribution from our will’’. For example, respiration,
digestion, walking, sleep, for human beings as well as for
animals, are actions that are driven ‘‘the same way as the
movement of a watch is produced, simply by the strength
of its spring and the configuration of its wheels’’ (1985,
p. 335). In fine, in order to explain the mechanism of this
machine, we do not need a vegetative or sensory soul or
any other principle of movement and life’’ (1985, p. 108)
such as clarified by Aristotle in his treatise On the Soul.
Even the passions of the soul, which are thoughts, albeit
thoughts that owe nothing to our will, are explained by the
mechanics of the body.
The use of the machine metaphor to represent the body
went on to govern modern western medicine in a decisive
way. Even today, the practice of artificial organs, of organ
transplantation and donation perfectly illustrate this image
of a machine, as if it were only a question of changing parts
to restart the machine.
However, Descartes did not reduce human beings to an
assemblage of mechanical parts. He writes: ‘‘I am not that
assembly of limbs that is called the human body’’ (1984,
p. 18). While this model of the body, as a machine, pos-
sesses a most interesting heuristics function on the epis-
temological level, it is different on the moral level of
everyday life. There is a discontinuity between the two. In
others words, when the moment comes for human beings
to determine their lives, they cannot rely solely on theo-
retical knowledge of what life is. They must take into
account their experience of life which never appears per-
fectly clearly, but emerge more often in an uncertain and
cluttered manner. Human beings, as opposed to animals
that act without thought, according to Descartes, cannot
make moral decision in a mechanical way, because they
are spirits endowed with reason and will, and are con-
scious of inhabiting a body. What makes man a human
being, is the union of body and soul (1985, p. 99). In this
way, whereas nature as an object of thought is non-nor-
mative, it is different when nature is lived through the
fusion of body and soul. If we return therefore to organ
transplantation, it becomes not only a question of repairing
2 Lettre du 25 janvier 1638, Ch. Adam et P. Tannery, Œuvres de
Descartes, I, 507 tire´ de G.A. Lindeboom, Descartes and Medicine,
Amsterdam, Rodopoi, 1978, p. 35. ‘‘I am working now on composing
a Summary of Medicine that I am deriving partially from books and
partially from my reasoning’’ . My own translation.
3 Descartes stand in opposition to the vision of Montaigne
(Cf Essays, II, 12) according to which the difference between human
being and animal is a difference of degree, whereas for Descartes, it is




the body-machine, but a life decision that asks the ques-
tion: Quod vitae sectabor iter? (Which path of life shall I
choose?).4
When the time comes to make decisions regarding the
orientation of life, human beings do not rely solely on
knowledge established by objectivity, but more on judg-
ment that finds its source in subjective experience. For
example, a disease often suffered in pain and entailing
sadness, teaches us to deal with our finite nature due to the
union of body and soul. In the sixth of his Meditations on
First Philosophy, Descartes showed that the soul is not
accommodated by the body ‘‘as a pilot in his ship’’ (1984,
p. 56). Because of its embodiment in a body, the soul
experiences sensations, appetites, and passions through
which it feels its body not as a foreign object, but as its own
body. The knowledge that human beings have of their body
is not a conceptual knowledge, but an experienced knowl-
edge that escapes the representations of the intellect. This is
why Descartes thought that he knew ‘‘the animal in general
[…] and not yet man in particular’’ (1991, p. 134), because
‘‘those that belong to the union of the soul and the body
understand each other only slightly by the intellect alone
[…] but very clearly through the senses’’ (1991, p. 226).
Within this knowledge acquired through experience, it is
nature that enlightens human beings.
Nature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain,
hunger, thirst, and so on, that I am not merely present
in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but that I
am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled
with it, so that I and the body form a unit (1984,
p. 56).
The experience of passion is not only the mechanical effect
of the body, but above all the expression of the true man
(1985, p. 141), that is the reasonable man, the one who
makes use of his judgment. For Descartes passions are
useful for the conservation of life (1991, p. 300), because
‘‘they dispose our soul to want the things that nature deems
useful to us, and to persist in this volition’’ (1985, p. 349).
In brief, in order to exercise his reasonable soul or his
judgment, the human being must rely upon life (1991,
p. 300) and refrain from using only the intellect.
When human beings are sick, they seek the good of the
body. Then, for Descartes, ‘‘the goods of the body […] do
not depend absolutely on us’’ (1991, p. 325). It is incum-
bent to rely solely on ‘‘the power of nature’’ (1991,
p. 1280). Descartes returns to the concept of nature and its
principle ‘‘vis medicatrix naturae’’ such as understood by
the ancient Greeks and found in the Hippocratic tradition.
This is the reason that he proposes therapeutic
interventions to Princess Elizabeth aimed at resting the
mind, because a rested mind is more receptive to the
healing forces of nature, especially if the mind places itself
in harmony with nature by observing it and dwelling within
it. Thanks to the art of medicine, it is possible to prolong
life provided that human beings draw their inspiration from
animals or nature to regulate their lives (1991, p. 1402)
insofar as nature ‘‘understands more clearly’’ than any
doctor [what is needed] for its own restoration. Man must
focus his attention on the intelligence of his own experi-
ence to guide him in his choices for a healthy life. In this
way, a reasonable man is one who relies on his own life
experiences to decide what is good for him, in this par-
ticular case, his health. In order to acquire this highly
useful knowledge of life, Descartes holds that we must turn
to practical rather than speculative philosophy (1985,
p. 142). This philosophy which resides halfway between
the clarity of knowledge and the confusion of the senses, is
the morality that appeals to our judgment rather than to our
knowledge and to our senses, despite of the attendant risks.
The naturalist point of view
Regrettably, what the history of western thought retains of
Descartes amounts to his methodological dualism. Des-
cartes, a worthy disciple of Aristotle, in spite of the severe
criticism he drafted with respect to Aristotelian episte-
mology, does not confound the order of knowledge or
theory with the order of judgment or practice. Both rely on
the understanding of nature to feed the judgment on life.
However, with the development of new technologies at the
end of the XXth century, confusion settled in between these
two language games. According to Habermas, ‘‘the estab-
lishment of new technologies that deeply permeate sub-
strates of the human person that used to be regarded as
‘natural’ promotes a naturalistic self-understanding among
experiencing subjects in their interactions with one
another’’ (2008, p. 239). Also confused is the order of
causality with that of validity. What of this naturalism? It
remains very difficult to give an exact definition of natu-
ralism given its long history and its ramifications. For our
purpose, two types of naturalism can be delineated: onto-
logical naturalism and methodological naturalism. To
simplify, let us say that ontological naturalism amounts to
the idea that reality contains no supernatural entity and that
methodological naturalism is a working hypothesis helping
us to better understand nature which, in many cases, proves
fruitful from a scientific point of view.
This naturalism, since Darwin, demonstrates that human
beings are animals or living creatures much like other
creatures having gone through a lengthy evolutionary
process. Nothing distinguishes them from animals. Even
4 This question was revealed to Descartes in one of his dreams on the
night of November 10–11 1619.
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mental phenomena, which have appeared until now as the
privilege of human beings, are seen as natural phenomena.
In short, human beings are natural beings (Schaeffer 2007).
Whereas, for Descartes, thought resides outside of the
body, naturalism suggests that thought is an integral part of
nature.
The only question for human beings becomes that of
their adaptability to their environment. In this respect, the
issue of organ donation or transplantation is part of the
conversation between the self and the species. In other
words, the individual will no longer rely on the intelligible,
but directly on nature.
This type of naturalism may be found in ecological
movements and among animal defence groups. The various
currents of animal ethics show that between human beings
and other species, there exists only a difference of degree.
This takes us back to the reflection of Montaigne on ani-
mals in his text An apology for Raymond Sebond (2003). In
this way, the moral duty of human beings is to care for the
community of living creatures. There is no longer any
immortal soul, but only living creatures that must be pro-
tected. We have moved from a working hypothesis to a real
definition of a human being. Otherwise stated, from the
description of a human being, it is possible to conclude
certain prescriptions. The sources of our thoughts become
the reasons for our choices of action. It is no longer the ego
that thinks, but the brain. This leads to an ontological
monism according to which ‘‘reasons and causes are two
aspects of a single phenomenon’’ to the extent that ‘‘rea-
sons represent the subjective side –the ‘experiential form’-
of neurologically observable processes’’ (Habermas 2008,
p. 158). In doing so, we so naturalize both the morality and
the contents of thought.
For Habermas, what ‘‘is so unsettling is the fact that the
dividing line between the nature we are and the organic
equipment we give ourselves is being blurred’’ (2003,
p. 22) through the prowess of biotechnology. Biotechno-
logical intervention replaces the relationship of care and
breaks the link between nature and human beings. The
‘‘manipulation […] rescinds the distinction between clini-
cal action and technical fabrication with respect to our own
inner nature’’ (2003, p. 50). The individual cuts himself off
from the intelligence of nature for the benefit of his pref-
erence: preserving his life. In light of such a perspective, it
is easy to understand why organ transplantation becomes
an undisputed imperative. With naturalism, everything is
nature, but a nature divested of meaning.
Phenomenological and hermeneutical perspectives
It is entirely possible that nature and disease possess no
meaning. According to Spinoza, the movement of nature
relies upon its own mechanical laws and not on intention.
Rather, it is human beings who would attribute a meaning
to these laws. This is why, for human beings, it is not
merely about merely existing, but about being something
connected to a world of meaning. There is a finality which
consists in reaching a degree of superior achievement.
From then on, in the world of experience, imbued with the
desire for meaning, human beings remain Aristotelian.
When the moment comes to deliberate, human beings do
not rely only on theoretical (theoria) or technical (techne`)
knowledge, but on their judgment (phronesis) (Aristotle
1941, pp. 1026–1028) nourished by inter-subjectivity and
culture. Aristotle and Descartes, contrary to the defenders
of naturalism, understood correctly that when it comes to
giving an orientation to life, it is necessary to rely on a
further rationality based on a dimension of experience.
Phenomenologists, for their part, are interested in the
body in action, seeing in this a source of wisdom. The body
possesses the capacity of executing spontaneous move-
ments. These movements are made possible by a native
dynamism that dwells in the body. When human beings are
not affected by disease, their movements deploy effort-
lessly, ‘‘naturally’’. Human beings are carried by vital
dynamics. They are engaged in a fundamental suffering
(patior). In this way, Ju¨rg Zutt declared that human beings
were ‘‘carried’’ (Getragensein) by organs, physiological
and psychic functions that provided rules for the future
(1963). Hubertus Tellenbach, saw in this vital force of the
body an appearance of ‘‘endogeneity’’ (1980). The concept
of ‘‘endogeneity’’ expresses that which is deeper in human
beings. Human beings undergo these vital processes. They
rely on all the ‘‘non-volitive’’ (1980, p. 40). However, this
suffering is not an absolute. It is something from which
human beings enter into a dialogue. Paul Ricœur (1966,
p. 275) underlined it well. ‘‘Human existence is like a
dialogue with an involuntary multiple protean involun-
tary’’. He detailed this experience in the following way:
‘‘I submit to the body that I guide’’ (1966, p. 276). How-
ever, human beings do not drive the body according to their
good will. Quite the contrary, they move it according to the
appropriate requirements of the body. There is thus circu-
larity between the voluntary and the involuntary. This
explains why to go against this native spontaneity is to
break a kind of natural law. However, if this recognition of
the body’s own intelligence, as witnessed in animals, can
become a guide for human behaviour in the face of situa-
tions, in the here and now, the fact remains that this
knowledge is useless in making decisions about fate,
except in recognizing that organ transplantation can still
grant human beings insight into the body.
It is difficult to clarify this natural intelligence, espe-
cially since our understanding of this intelligence is
dependent on our culture, our history and our biography. It
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is important to exercise caution. The greatest caution
comes from acting prudently or, according to Heidegger, in
letting be (Gelassenheit). Consequently, while waiting for
and hoping for a better certainty, human beings have to
deliberate and rely on their own thinking. As Hegel pointed
out, thought is not reducible to nature (1963, p. 32) nor is it
a by-product. A contrario, thought gives meaning to nature.
Thus, human beings, because of the thought they exercise,
become the place where nature becomes aware of itself.
Given human finiteness, the meaning of existence never
appears in its objectivity, but always according to human
subjectivity. If human beings have no direct access to the
meaning of nature to provide enlightenment in relation to
their own lives, they can gain a better understanding if they
rely on the story of their lives. The life story substitutes for
nature in granting a better understanding of existence. This
does not mean supplying explanations on our life in the
case of events provoking other events. The story of a life
emerges from our reading of these events in regard to an
undefined finiteness: that towards which human beings go
without knowing where they are going, but that nourishes
thought.
From the moment human beings deliberate on possible
life choices, they are struck by their own ignorance, and the
uncertainty that accompanies it. According to Kant, in this
moment of crisis, human beings leave behind the deter-
minism of nature to rise to the world of freedom. This
freedom does not consist in acting indiscriminately, but
rather in making choices that relate to a life story in search
of meaning that makes possible an outcome to the intrigue
of personal life. This intrigue at the heart of our life stories
revolves around the desire for self-fulfillment. Conse-
quently, organ transplantation is not only decided by
relying on arguments provided by the intellect, but on
reading a life story that tries to understand and accomplish
itself. That is why it becomes essential to reflect on the way
the donor and receiver experience the organ donation.
Donor and recipient experiences
A person could find devastating the idea that his or her life
depends from now on on a gift from another person. The
gift could have many meanings as much for the donor as
for the recipient. As Fox and Swazey (2002) noted, organ
transplantation is similar to the dynamics of gift exchange.
The process involves giving, receiving and reciprocity. The
locus classicus on the subject of gift giving is Marcel
Mauss’s The Gift: forms and functions of exchanges in
archaic society (1990) elaborated in the 1920s. According
to Mauss, despite the common notion that gifts are vol-
untary, they are in fact obligatory. To receive a gift is to
become ‘‘indebted’’ to the donor. The recipient becomes
obliged to reciprocity. Fox and Swazey designate this
experience as the ‘‘tyranny of the gift’’ (2002). This
exchange model can explain ‘‘the strains and stresses that
donors, receivers and their families often experience’’
about an organ transplantation (Gill and Lowes 2008;
Conrad and Murray 1999).
For living kidney donors, the act of donation in helping
another has been described as one of the most altruistic and
meaningful acts. The donor experiences emotional, psy-
chological and spiritual benefits. This consists mainly of an
increased self-esteem (Franklin 1994; Gill and Lowes
2008; Brown et al. 2008). Also, it has been shown that the
donor’s decision-making process was instantaneous and
involved little deliberation (Gill and Lowes 2008). Helping
to restore the health of another comes spontaneously. It is
not something that is conceived as ‘‘heroic’’. Rather it is a
‘‘natural thing to do’’ as the donor had ‘‘no choice’’ (Gill
and Lowes 2008; Zeiler et al. 2010; Alnaes 2012). The
donor does not expect any kind of return. The ‘‘joy of
giving’’ is worthwhile in itself (Godbout and Caille 2000).
An American study reported that the donors did not regret
their donation (Pradel et al. 2003). Therefore, giving an
organ has a transformative and positive impact on the
donor such as a feeling of happiness (Simmons et al. 1987;
Johnson et al. 1999; Fehrman-Ekholm et al. 2000; Bur-
rough et al. 2003; Stothers et al. 2005).
But some potential donors refuse to donate for fear of
adverse effects (Sajjad et al. 2007), the expectation of a
possible kidney failure in the future, the concern of having
done something in vain because the transplantation was not
a success (Lunsford et al. 2007) or for religious and ethnic
influences (Wakefield et al. 2011). Research has also drawn
attention to various reasons for the refusal to donate on the
part of families (Simonoff et al. 2001). Some reasons are
related to the context of the death, the timing of the request,
the place where the request is made and the person making
the request. This is not to mention the possible discomfort
of having to make a decision in place of the deceased
person.
The case of Jean-Luc Nancy
Recipients are characteristically very grateful to their
donors (Gill and Lowes 2008), even though some recipi-
ents will refuse any offers of transplantation from family
members to avoid any kind of indebtedness (Olbrisch et al.
2001).
The French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, himself a heart
and lung transplant recipient, describes his story in a short
book (2010). He shows that the experience of being a
transplant recipient is an extreme almost unimaginable one
and therefore difficult to communicate within our every
Organ transplantation and meaning of life 571
123
day world. The kidney, the heart, the lungs are certainly
corporeal, but they remain somewhat intangible like, accord-
ing Derrida (2005), Psyche`. Their near absence causes us to
talk about her, peri psyche, as something strange and queer.
In fact, like Nancy said, we do not recognize ourselves. The
relation to the self is no longer apparent, immediate. In this
sense, the recipient emerges lost from this experience. And
the experience never stops because the intruder, the trans-
planted organ, instead of naturalizing itself, continues to
intrude. Thus, it is necessary to receive this stranger and
honour his presence. It becomes possible to say that we are no
longer one, but rather many, so that the boundary between
oneself and the other is not clear as is the frontier between
death and life, young and old. Everything meshes. But the
touch of another results in feeling oneself, that we touch
ourselves, and that we are there and alive.
From a psychoanalytical perspective, people say that
being a recipient is like having somebody inside as though
the donor were there everyday. Even if the donor has died, he
is still alive. Therefore, the organ is not a mechanical part, but
a living organ. ‘‘What is inside me is a life’’ (Goetzmann
2004, p. 282). In this case, we cannot say that the technology
that renders organ donation and transplantation possible
dehumanizes the organ (Sharp 2001, p. 115).
What the recipient receives in transplantation is not
merely an organ or a body part, but ‘‘life’’ itself (Deguchi
2002). The body we have is the first gift of life, in the sense
that it is not only a utilitarian object, but that by which we
receive life. The body, in addition to having its own his-
tory, is the site of another story. It serves as a condition to
live in closer harmony with the meaning we give to a good
life. It is not an end in itself, but a means. Both giving and
receiving a body is to give meaning to life.
Caring and thinking
Illness teaches us that there is a gap between what we are at
present and what we could become. Organ transplantation
would close this gap. Nevertheless, in a certain sense, it is
precisely this gap between the meaning that we give to
nature and the withdrawal of nature in regard to this
meaning that makes human beings alive by constantly re-
launching the dialogue with nature on new terms. What is
at stake in organ transplantation is how the truth plays out.
Living with a new organ goes beyond the simple fact of
being still alive. The recipient must elaborate anew his
relationship to the world: a precarious life characterized by a
lot of mourning. This implies a search for a new wisdom to
transform illness into a initiatory journey that flies in the face
of social convention and finds what is essential to existence.
William James in The Variety of Religious Experience
insisted on the spiritual value of an encounter with death.
In the eyes of Jaspers, facing death becomes a limit-situation.
As with all limit situations, the human being is confronted by
his own incomprehension. Can it be said that a person who
receives organ transplants misses an opportunity to experi-
ence an awakening to the human condition through the
mourning of both certain desires and a part of themselves?
The fact of tying a medical and psychological answer, that is
to say technical, to existential questions distracts human
beings from reflection. This attitude cannot but create a new
existential blockage (Jaspers 1966, p. 92). A contrario, again
according to Jaspers, reflection upon the sense of human
existence presents itself as the place where we are ourselves
(1966, p. 94) that which places us on the road to compre-
hension, without however claiming certainty. In this sense
reflexivity is at the very core of the human condition. Within
it is bound up the relationship with oneself, with others and
with the mystery of existence. It constitutes the work of
living: learning from our own life in order to live better
(Montaigne 2003, p. 425). Being confronted with one’s own
death becomes an occasion to mature, to awaken to oneself.
Thus, what keeps a human being alive cannot be counted
merely in terms of medical interventions, but rather in the
care taken in reflecting on the sense of existence in relation to
his own accomplishment.
We have indicated that reflecting on the sense of exis-
tence does not necessarily lead to certainty. It would be a
mistake however to believe that arbitrariness is acceptable.
In order to avoid the arbitrary, it is important to carry out
the reflection in a context of intersubjectivity constituted by
the Socratic dialogue (Nelson 1965). We need others to
nourish our reflection. In this respect, Socrates is surely an
exemplary figure. He believed, according to Plato’s
The Apologie of Socrates (38a), that a life worth living is
one which examines itself. Without offering any solution
or knowledge, the role of the philosopher in raising rele-
vant questions consisted in helping other people to give
birth to their own ideas. This is the reason why Socrates or
the philosopher is described in the Plato’s Theaetetus
(150c–151b) as a midwife.
In this sense, philosophy does not consist in manipulating
abstract concepts, but in receiving ‘‘philosophical questions
posed by life’’ (Lahav and da Venza Tillmanns 1995, p. x).
That is why the ‘‘entire field of medical ethics, for instance,
with its dilemmas regarding euthanasia, abortion, extraor-
dinary means of prolonging life, etc. is necessarily part of
philosophical counselling’’ (Mijuskovic 1995, p. 92). But it
is not only the medical field that offers opportunities to think
about life. In fact, life itself is ‘‘a continuous interpretation of
ourselves and the world’’ (Lahav 1995, p. 24). Charles
Taylor (1985) designates human beings as self-interpreting
animals. According to Achenbach (1984), this concerns
philosophical questions issuing from life and is the subject
matter of philosophical counselling.
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From that moment on, ‘‘philosophical counselling offers
a controlled and directed environment in which life—
herein understood as a process of interpretation- is inten-
sified’’ (Lavah 1995, p. 24). It consists in rendering explicit
what is hidden or implicit. This act of hermeneutics enables
a better phenomenology and this improved phenomenol-
ogy, in return, intensified the act of hermeneutics.
Thus, organ transplantation can become a final appeal that
precisely allows the prolonging of life and the multiplying of
opportunities to experience it, because after death, there is no
longer any possibility of experiencing. Heidegger in Being
and Time explained that with death comes the possibility of
the impossible. The body thus deserves quality care. Of
course there is always the chance of being reduced to an
animal condition in a world deprived of meaning.
The body serves as a support to the experience of
awakening which in turn enlightens nature and our life
stories by giving them meaning, i.e. a reason for being. In
this respect, awakening gives access to different and
immeasurable levels of reality: nature and meaning. Thus,
if we rely on the Greek meaning of the verb to meditate,
medow, to meditate on nature and to care for nature as one
would one’s body constitutes the same undertaking.
The first care we can bestow upon the body consists in
thinking it. To think it is to act on nature that, in turn, acts on
thought. It is as though by thinking nature, human beings
give themselves their own determination. The important
point consists in establishing a hermeneutic circle between
what we think and what reminds us to think. In this way, the
experience of nature is always mediated by the language of
culture understood as the repository of questions and
meaning. In other words, meaning gives access to nature
while simultaneously being an event of nature. Within this
intelligible order, nature encounters itself.
In the Odyssey, Ulysses, then a prisoner of Calypso, is
offered immortality if he stays by her side. Ulysses refuses
the offer, because he wishes to remain a human being, that
is, a mortal. Therefore, human beings deliberate and make
choices in consideration of the way they understand
themselves and their lives. The most important thing is the
occurrence of understanding. For that to happen, human
nature must live, but live a life that accepts not to under-
stand everything. What makes human beings worth living
is the desire for self-understanding in relation to the fulf-
ilment of self. In other words, it is the act of thinking and of
caring that gives meaning to human existence.
Conclusion
If today organ transplantation is a common place occur-
rence, it is no less true that the subjective experience of it
in relation to the good life may remain unintelligible. We
have attempted to understand through an examination of
Aristotle, Descartes and naturalism, that human beings
have relied on an interpretation of nature to gain greater
understanding and thereby help orient their lives. Finally,
the story of Nancy and others shows that it is in the
experience itself constituted by interpretation, as much for
the donor and the recipient that it is possible to better
understand what is entailed and to give it meaning. The
human experience of organ transplantation demonstrates
that thinking about and caring for the body is part of the
same undertaking in the sense that it is the act of thinking
as well as caring that gives meaning to human existence.
For that to happen, we need the presence of others inside a
Socratic dialogue as we encounter it inside philosophical
counselling. The reflection on the good life is prescribed by
our own essence: that of the self-interpreting being. The
possibility of organ transplantation depends a great deal on
the culture we live in: a culture of interpretation. Organ
transplantation becomes an extreme experience that
intensifies philosophical questionings, a hermeneutical
stance about oneself and the world.
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